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Publishing Research in Empirical Ethics: Quality, 
Disciplines and Expertise 
Lucy Frith, Heather Draper 
This chapter looks at some of the challenges for reporting and publishing results in 
empirical ethics, an emerging methodological approach to research in applied ethics. 
Many of these challenges have their origins in how empirical ethics is defined and 
where it sits in relation to other disciplines. Accordingly, we consider the relationship 
between bioethics and empirical ethics, situating these discussions within the debates 
over whether bioethics is a discipline..1 We explore the construction of academic 
disciplines in general and examine questions such as, ‘Is bioethics a discipline in its own 
right?’ ‘Is it a branch of philosophy?’ ‘Or is it a combination of several disciplines that 
collaborate to answer certain questions?’ Following from this, we will consider what 
counts as expertise in bioethics, as this has a bearing on what bioethicists are seen as 
contributing when they undertake research in empirical ethics. These insights will then 
be applied to how empirical ethics should be reported. We will conclude that as 
empirical ethics grows, general quality and reporting standards will emerge and these 
will gain  general acceptance as empirical ethics becomes more established. 
                                                          
1 Empirical ethics is a particular methodological approach and as such is 
applicable to other areas of applied ethics such as business ethics. 
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What Is an Academic Discipline? 
The word ‘discipline’ is commonly used to delineate a pre-ordained category of 
academic enterprise, almost like a Platonic form: an ideal type. For an area of inquiry to 
be seen as lying within a specific discipline it has to follow certain rules and procedures, 
draw on particular theories, and publish and disseminate in appropriate journals and 
forums. 
Disciplinary conventions can be used as a way to draw boundaries between 
acceptable and unacceptable scholarship. These conventions can be used both formally, 
in academic journals or conference presentation requirements, or informally over coffee 
when discussing someone’s work or job candidates: ‘she is not a proper philosopher’ or 
‘that is not proper sociology’. These ‘not proper’ comments are pejorative value 
judgements and such criticisms are often levied at bioethicists. As Lewens observes, it is 
often said that the problem with bioethics is, ‘that most bioethicists have a limited grip 
on “serious philosophy”’ (2004: 121) and therefore are not ‘proper’ philosophers. 
The increasing importance in the UK of disciplinary boundaries is due partly to 
the advent of the research assessment exercises (RAEs), which have been organised 
around subject discipline panels that assess research in a particular domain.2 The 
increasing importance of disciplinary boundaries with their own definitions of what 
                                                          
2 In the UK, RAEs are used to rank Universities and rank is used to make 
inferences about the quality of the research produced by different institutions and 
research clusters within institutions. There is sometimes a mismatch between what the 
different subject panels set out in their guidance on eligibility and markers of quality 
and how institutions interpret this guidance. Institutions have tended to be 
conservative and to stick within mainstream examples of research in any particular 
discipline. As a consequence, bioethics is seen not to have a natural fit in any of the 
subject panels (Kong et al., 2011). 
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counts as ‘appropriate’, ‘good quality’ and ‘meaningful’ research operates alongside a 
contrary force: the drive for inter-disciplinarity, defined as, ‘any form of dialogue or 
interaction between two or more disciplines’ (Moran, 2002). Inter-disciplinarity aims to 
break down artificial boundaries between subjects and is seen as a way of addressing 
the grand challenges facing humanity, such as climate change and food scarcity, 
something that funders, and hence universities, are keen to encourage. For example, the 
Research Councils UK states, 
The Research Councils already support a great deal of inter-
disciplinary research, which benefits from drawing together insights and 
approaches from a number of established research disciplines … RCUK 
wishes to support an enhanced culture of interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary research in the UK and to ensuring that its peer review 
and funding infrastructure is supportive of such work. (RCUK, 2014) 
Interdisciplinary work comes with costs: there is uncertainty over where to 
publish the results, there are difficulties with assessing quality and outputs do not fit 
into any of the standard assessment frameworks. All this can limit the understanding 
and appreciation of interdisciplinary research. As Marilyn Strathern commented, ‘one 
knows one is in an interdisciplinary context if there is resistance to what one is doing’ 
(2005: 130). All these issues are relevant to empirical ethics and we will consider them 
below. 
If inter-disciplinarity means crossing disciplinary boundaries, this raises the 
question of what these boundaries are. There are many accounts of what a discipline is, 
and there is not space in this chapter to go into this in detail. As Krishnan (2009) states, 
there are different approaches to conceptualising academic disciplines that include 
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sociological, anthropological, philosophical, historical and management/organisational 
perspectives. In an attempt to determine what the essence of a discipline is, Krishan sets 
out the following elements: 
• ‘disciplines have a particular object of research (e.g. law, society, politics), 
though the object of research may be shared with another discipline 
• ‘disciplines have a body of accumulated specialist knowledge referring to 
their object of research, which is specific to them and not generally shared 
with another discipline 
• ‘disciplines have theories and concepts that can organise the accumulated 
specialist knowledge effectively 
• ‘disciplines use specific terminologies or a specific technical language 
adjusted to their research object 
• ‘disciplines have developed specific research methods according to their 
specific research requirements 
• ‘disciplines must have some institutional manifestation in the form of 
subjects taught at universities or colleges, respective academic departments 
and professional associations connected to it’ (Krishnan, 2009: 10) 
The more of these characteristics a subject can claim, the more likely it is to be 
seen as an academic discipline capable of producing a body of scholarship (Krishnan, 
2009). The last element is crucial, as 
only through institutionalisation are disciplines able to reproduce 
themselves … . A new discipline is therefore usually founded by way of 
creating a professorial chair devoted to it at an established university.’ 
(Krishnan, 2009: 11) 
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Pierce notes: 
Although most studies fail to define the term [discipline] explicitly, 
they typically assume that boundaries of disciplines closely follows those 
of academic departments … [their] importance in creating and 
maintaining disciplinary communities makes the academic department 
the building block from which disciplines are created. (1991: 22–23) 
The history of the discipline of philosophy can be traced using this 
institutionalised focus, starting with the founding of a new chair and charting its 
subsequent development. One of the first ‘philosophy’ chairs was the Knightbridge 
Professor founded in 1683 at the University of Cambridge, originally called the Chair of 
Moral Theology or Casuistical Divinity, and often known as the Professor of Casuistry. In 
Cambridge before the early nineteenth century the only degree – or tripos – that could 
be studied was mathematics. A classics tripos was introduced in 1822 but was only 
available to graduates of the mathematics tripos. Philosophy began as part of an area of 
study called moral sciences (which included moral philosophy, political economy, 
modern history, general jurisprudence and the laws of England), which was introduced 
in 1848 and became a tripos in 1851 and honours in 1861. Around the middle of the 
nineteenth century, subjects began to become more  specialised. Law created its own 
tripos in 1858 with history, and these split into separate triposes in  1870. Economics 
became a separate degree subject in 1903. What was left of the original moral sciences 
tripos continued till it was renamed ‘philosophy’ in 1970. In 1881 the Chair of Logic, 
Mental and Moral Philosophy, and Political Economy at University College Liverpool 
was founded and it became the Chair of Philosophy in 1891. Hence, philosophy in its 
current institutional form has only existed for slightly over 100 years. In the nineteenth 
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century, psychology and philosophy were not seen as separate disciplines. Theorists 
who are now seen as philosophers – Hume, Hobbes and Locke – produced elaborated 
accounts of psychology; for Mill, logic was part, or a branch, of psychology; William 
James is seen as an ancestor of both psychologists and philosophers. The journal Mind, 
when it was founded in 1878, published articles that nowadays would be considered to 
be psychology. What we now know as economics had a similar relationship with 
philosophy. Adam Smith is an important theorist for both modern disciplines and 
economics was part of the original moral science tripos in Cambridge until 1903 when, 
as a discipline, it moved away from the moral  sciences (Alvey, 1999) and became a 
discipline in its own right. Now, university departments are moving away from 
‘traditional’ (twentieth-century) disciplinary boundaries to being organised around 
areas of study to reflect the aspiration for a greater interdisciplinary focus (such as 
departments of health and well being). 
Societal concerns, funding, teaching requirements, and location of academics (i.e. 
philosophers in medical schools) all combine to change the profile of academic 
disciplines. Disciplines can be seen as specific practices, with rules that determine 
which kind of statements are accepted as true or false within that particular discourse 
(Lyotard, 1984). Academic disciplines are socially contingent bodies with specific 
discursive strategies to address an area of shared concern. They are essentially 
‘communities of practice’, defined as ‘groups of people who share a concern or a passion 
for something they do and learn how to do it better as they interact regularly’ (Wenger, 
2006). Disciplines are not fixed or discrete entities, but continually change and evolve. It 
is against this historical background that we can begin to answer the question of 
whether bioethics is an academic discipline in its own right, recognising that bioethics, 
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and now empirical ethics, are part of the changing evolution of academic subjects and 
disciplines. 
Bioethics – Discipline or Not? 
Bioethics arose out of philosophy. ‘Bioethics’ is characterised as the ‘investigation of 
ethical issues arising in the life sciences … by applying the principles of moral 
philosophy to these issues’ (Bennett and Cribb, 2003: 10). At the ‘birth of bioethics’, 
philosophy and theology shaped the discipline with their methods and structures of 
abstract universal foundationalist theorising (Jonsen, 1998). Although bioethics is 
informed by other disciplines, its central methodology is philosophical. As Green 
observes, 
[w]hile ethics and moral philosophy may sometimes represent a 
relatively small part of the actual work of bioethics … the methods of 
ethics and philosophy remain indispensable to this domain of enquiry 
(1990: 182). 
Arguably, bioethics has changed and evolved since its beginnings in the middle of 
the twentieth century. It now encompasses a more divergent view of ethics, drawing on 
a wider theoretical canon (such as care ethics, feminist perspectives, postmodernism) 
and using different approaches to solve moral problems (such as empirical 
methodologies) (Herrera, 2008). Under our definition we would argue that bioethics is 
a discipline in its own right: it is a community of scholars, with its own journals, 
conferences, networks and ways of approaching and debating moral problems and 
issues in the area of the life sciences. This community includes others from disciplines 
such as medical law, medicine and sociology who contribute to this specific community 
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of practice.3 However, for it to be ethics, it has to keep as a central element the 
elucidation of normative claims and corresponding analytical strategies. 
Considering the development of empirical ethics through the lens of our 
conception of academic disciplines, we argue it is another step in the evolution of 
bioethics that should not be ruled out on predetermined theoretical commitments to 
‘pure’ philosophical method. There is not space in this chapter to revisit why bioethics 
in its philosophical form might use empirical data, how this relates to moral theory and 
the is/ought debate, nor why we need a particular discipline or sub-set of bioethics 
called ‘empirical ethics’. These questions have been debated extensively elsewhere4 
(Molewijk and Frith, 2009), but for our purposes we will take empirical ethics to be one 
of the methods of inquiry used by bioethicists to approach and explore moral issues. 
Empirical ethics moves away from what might be seen as the safe and 
established shores of conventional philosophical methods. As we have noted, 
bioethicists are often accused of not being proper philosophers, but with the advent of 
empirical ethics we now might be subject to the charge of not being proper sociologists 
as well. To address what ultimately comes down to the issue of who is given the 
privilege of having their research recognised and valued within the academic 
community of bioethics and outside, we will first consider the debate over what 
constitutes ‘expertise’, first in relation to bioethics, and then to how one qualifies as an 
expert in empirical ethics. 
 
                                                          
3 It is more institutionalised in the US, with departments of bioethics, but there 
are centres for bioethics in the UK. 
4 Including in this volume. 
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Expertise 
There has been extensive debate about what constitutes moral expertise and how this 
relates to the role bioethicists occupy on public bodies or when offering ethical advice 
(for example, in a clinical setting).5 There is a close link between how we define moral 
expertise and how moral judgements are justified (Gesang, 2010), but moral expertise 
can also focus on the process of decision-making rather than an ability to make ‘correct’ 
moral judgments. When considering whether bioethicists in their role qua bioethicists 
are experts, it is important to define exactly which role of the bioethicist we are talking 
about. As Archard notes, with reference to ‘ethics experts’ on public bodies, ‘[t]he fact 
that moral philosophers sit on the bodies in question is not tantamount to the exercise 
of the moral expertise’ (2011: 119–120). The nature of committees, he argues, is such 
that no one person is making the decision and usually such bodies make general policy 
recommendations rather than dictating specific actions. Thus, bioethicists on 
committees cannot be said to be making moral decisions in the way one might in one’s 
personal life. Nor can medical ethics consultants, certainly in the UK, who might be 
called in to advise on more pressing decisions, be said to be making decisions; their role 
is advisory and it is the health care professionals concerned who are the ones actually 
making the decision. Driver’s distinction between ‘three distinct forms of moral 
expertise’ is useful here: 
the expert judger, who does a better job of arriving at true moral 
judgements, the expert practitioner, who acts morally well more than 
others, and the expert in moral analysis who has greater than normal 
insight into the nature of morality (in some respect). (2013: 280) 
                                                          
5 See also Edwards and Deans (2016), in this volume. 
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The final definition seems best to capture the moral expertise of bioethicists; 
they are experts in moral analysis, which enables them to identify moral issues, moral 
distinctions, and non-sequiturs in moral reasoning, and to locate issues within the 
context of ethical theory. 
For Caplan, those trained in ethics have a set of traditions and theories that 
enable them to deliberate about and judge moral issues: 
A fully developed applied ethic would afford the moral philosopher 
an opportunity to examine the delicate interplay that occurs among fact, 
social roles and prescriptive principles in reaching moral decisions. 
(1982: 16) 
An ethicist has expertise in both normative theories and concepts and a good 
understanding of the area he or she is considering. An important aspect of this role is 
not just accepting the moral problems as presented by, say, doctors, because 
[a] knowledge of ethical theories, traditions and concepts allows 
the moral philosopher to see the normative aspects of ordinary events in 
ways that those more directly involved do not and sometimes will not. 
(Caplan, 1982: 14) 
Thus, the ethicist has the role of identifying and defining moral problems rather 
than simply offering solutions. Through the use of ethical theory one can highlight and 
clarify the areas of disagreement and discern underlying ethical problems and tensions. 
Theories and principles can be a tool for elucidating and analysing the data (Frith, 
2012), just as, for example, sociologists use theories of social interaction to approach 
their data (Maxwell, 1996). 
This view, as Singer notes, takes expertise as a skill: 
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… the moral philosopher does have some important advantages 
over the ordinary man. First his general training … should make him more 
than ordinarily competent in argument and in the detection of invalid 
inferences … his specific experience in moral philosophy gives him an 
understanding of moral concepts and of the logic of moral argument. The 
possibility of serious confusion arising if one engages in moral argument 
without a clear understanding of the concepts employed has been 
sufficiently emphasised … . Clarity is not an end in itself, but is an aid to 
sound argument. Finally there is the simple fact that the moral 
philosopher can, if he wants, think full-time about moral issues, whilst 
most other people have some occupation to pursue which interferes with 
such reflection. (1972: 117) 
Lillehammer talks about the advantage of being able to devote sufficient time to 
this type of deliberation: 
the role of bioethicists is vindicated by their possession of a critical 
and systematic mastery of ethical concepts and positions, of the 
presuppositions of such positions, and the relations and distinctions 
between them. It is in the application of this knowledge that philosophical 
expertise comes into its own right by encouraging a more informed level 
of debate in bioethics. It is not that bioethicists offer expertise that 
scientists, doctors, or politicians are in principle barred from acquiring on 
their own. It is rather that the division of intellectual labour provides the 
benefit of input from persons devoted to the systematic study of the 
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theoretical complexities embodied in ethical concepts applied in practical 
bioethical debate. (2004: 133) 
At the heart of these skills-based accounts is that a good bioethicist is not more 
likely to make better moral judgments, but is likely to help others to make better moral 
judgements by aiding the process of decision-making. 
This suggests a process account that could be constructed along the lines of the 
importance of employing procedural justice, akin to Daniels’ (2008) accountability-for-
reasonableness approach. This approach privileges process because there is unlikely to 
be agreement on substantive decisions. Richard Ashcroft (2008) has expressed 
concerns that process accounts abrogate bioethicists’ responsibilities and ultimately 
make them redundant. Instead, he argues, bioethicists should be producing and 
defending substantive moral arguments, and this is the unique contribution of the 
bioethicist in policy forums. There are two rejoinders to this view. First, in a committee 
neither the bioethicist, nor any other individual, is asked to make a moral decision. 
Rather, it is the job of the committee to come to some collective decision. Second, as 
Frith has argued elsewhere (2009), a good process can lead to good substantive moral 
decisions – the process and end are not separate entities. 
In conclusion, what determines a bioethicist’s skill and usefulness is essentially 
the skill of argumentation, the ability to pick out key moral issues and determine ways 
of thinking about moral problems that might not be immediately available to the non-
bioethicist. This raises the question, ‘How does empirical ethics fit into bioethics 
expertise as we have conceptualised it?’ 
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Empirical Ethics and Expertise 
The answer to this question depends on one’s conception of empirical ethics and, as 
argued above, our conception of empirical ethics keeps at its heart a broad conception 
of philosophical method and corresponding skills. There are different forms of empirical 
ethics and different ways in which the relationship between empirical data and ethical 
theory can be conceptualised (as demonstrated in this volume). Does empirical data 
leave ethical theory unaltered? Or does empirical data have some influence on the 
actual content and structure of ethical theory itself? To consider the different 
conceptions of empirical ethics and what contribution bioethicists might make to 
empirical work, we want briefly to give an overview of the empirical work conducted in 
bioethics to illuminate different forms of empirical ethics. Draper and Ives (2007) 
categorise6 different ways sociological research has been employed in ethical reasoning, 
and thereby provide an example of how two different disciplines might come together 
under the ‘empirical ethics umbrella’. The three broad categories are (i) sociology of 
bioethics, (ii) sociology for bioethics and (iii) sociology in bioethics.7 It is possible that 
some studies could fall into more than one category – the categories are not mutually 
exclusive. 
                                                          
6 There are obvious limitations with constructing any typology of this nature. 
The intention is to broadly group approaches that share certain characteristics for 
clarification purposes. 
7 These categories are similar to those often used in medical sociology (White, 
2002). 
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Sociology of Bioethics 
The sociology of bioethics incorporates two aspects: (1) seeing bioethics and 
bioethicists as objects of study and (2) examining the social context of bioethical issues 
or problems. Ethical issues may be studied by the methods of social science. The papers 
in DeVries et al.’s edition of Sociology of Health and Illness (2006), for example, are 
largely an attempt to put bioethical issues (such as the ethics of research and social 
policy) into a social context.8 A sociology of bioethics can engage with ethical theory to 
varying degrees. Bosk’s (1992) study of genetic counselling in a paediatric hospital, for 
example, although looking at an area of great ethical concern, does not explicitly employ 
or consider ethical theory in its analysis. Other studies and authors critically engage 
with ethical theory and use their studies to demonstrate what they see as failings in the 
traditional bioethics. Anspach (1993), for example, in her study of decision-making in 
an intensive care nursery, explicitly engages with the bioethical debate over life-and-
death decisions in intensive care. Alderson (1990) used her empirical findings to 
advance a form of the ‘social science critique’ of bioethics. 
Sociology for Bioethics 
The sociology for bioethics uses empirical research to produce data for bioethics. In 
practice, says Weisz, social scientists ‘can provide ethicists with data, ranging from 
descriptions of the historical origins of current ethical debates to information about 
how people in different cultures and at different social levels actually behave in ethically 
problematic situations’ (1990: 5). Empirical research could be used to identify moral 
                                                          
8 See also Haimes’ work on genetic databases, discussed in Haimes and Williams 
(2007). 
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issues that need to be studied. Baruch Brody argues for this sort of role for empirical 
research in bioethics: 
It can identify issues that actually arise and processes actually 
used for dealing with them, thereby suggesting where normative analysis 
is most needed. (1993: 218) 
The models of sociology of and for bioethics largely keep the disciplinary 
boundaries between ethics and sociology separate. There is ethical theory on the one 
hand and there is sociologically gathered evidence on the other. 
Sociology in Bioethics 
The sociology in bioethics attempts to break down the boundaries between empirical 
evidence and ethical theory. It uses empirical data to directly alter and shape ethical 
theory: 
For example, one might wish to modify the theory of patient 
autonomy towards the social practice of surgical decision-making in 
elderly men on the basis of empirical data. (Stigglebout et al., 2004: 269) 
Thus, ‘bioethical theorising … is not removed from lived experience – it is based upon it.’ 
(Draper and Ives, 2007: 325) 
There are many forms of empirical ethics, each with a different emphasis 
depending on the disciplinary background and concerns of the research team. There is 
no single right way of doing empirical ethics; it depends on what the aims of the study 
are (Ives and Draper, 2009). It is now accepted, in the general research community, that 
  16 
neither qualitative nor quantitative methods are intrinsically ‘better’ than the other.9 
Rather, which paradigm you draw on depends on the research question and the key 
aspects of the world that one wants to investigate. We consider the same is true of 
empirical ethics. 
Role of the Bioethicist in Empirical Ethics 
To return to the question of what the philosophically orientated bioethicists can 
contribute to empirical ethics work, we take our favoured definition of empirical ethics 
as one that incorporates some form of normative, and hence philosophical, method, and 
integrates this with empirical data; a form of sociology in ethics. It could be argued that 
ethicists, trained in philosophy, are not the best people to carry out the research from 
which these data are derived. Levitt (2004), for example, argues that bioethics and 
sociology should remain complementary rather than seek to become more integrated. 
Appiah, who despite being very sympathetic to the use of empirical findings in the 
discussion of moral deliberation, says, ‘Philosophy should be open to what it can learn 
from experiments; it doesn’t need to set up its own laboratories.’ (2008: 3) 
There are two reasons we argue that bioethicists should be involved in the actual 
conduct of empirical studies and thereby involved in forming a distinctive type of 
empirical ethics inquiry based on bioethical expertise rather than just leaving it to 
sociologists. First, a study designed by an ethicist and therefore driven by 
predominately ‘ethical’ concerns will have a different emphasis and focus from those 
conducted by sociologists. This is not the only way to approach ethical issues or areas, 
                                                          
9 Although the recent decision of the BMJ not to publish qualitative research may 
suggest the value of such research is still being questioned (Greenhalgh et al., 2016). 
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but there is room for studies of this type alongside more conventionally conceived 
sociological ones. Second, ethicists might (and this is a more controversial claim) be 
better able to design studies that produce the kind of data that are of use in conducting 
an ethical analysis. For example, if interview data is collected by an ethicist, there will be 
a difference in how the conversations are focussed, the prompts used and the ideas 
explored that will focus more on the normative aspects of the encounter.10 Even if the 
claim that ethicists might be better at collecting their own data for their own purposes 
is disputed, our central claim is that there is room for a distinctive type of empirical 
ethics study: a study that uses ethical theory and principles in the collection and 
analysis of the data and seeks to say something about the theories and principles 
themselves as well as the phenomena under study (Frith, 2012). Hence, it is valuable for 
ethicists to carry out their own empirical studies, and in doing so they can make a 
distinctive contribution to the literature and create a ‘community of practice’ that 
integrates empirical evidence and moral theorising. 
Quality and Reporting 
We have described a particular form of empirical ethics that integrates moral theorising 
and empirical research and therefore creates, arguably, a ‘new’ form of academic 
inquiry. There have, however, been concerns expressed about the quality of this kind of 
empirical ethics, claiming it is bad philosophy, bad sociology, or a combination of both. 
In this section we will address these issues as they relate to our conception of empirical 
ethics, ‘sociology in ethics’. Other forms of empirical ethics that do not integrate the 
                                                          
10 Farsides and Williams’ work is a good example of this, and they elaborate on 
this approach in their chapter (Farsides and Williams, 2016) in this volume. 
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normative and the empirical may not face such reporting challenges, as they are able to 
report along more conventional disciplinary lines. 
The debate over the quality of empirical ethics mirrors the one that has taken 
place over quality in qualitative research. This debate is particularly relevant here, as 
empirical ethics has drawn heavily on the insights provided from qualitative research. 
Like empirical ethics, qualitative research has had to spend a considerable amount of 
time justifying why it is a suitable alternative approach to quantitative techniques 
(Murphy et al., 1998). Hurst (2010) argues that empirical ethics has focussed for too 
long on more metaethical issues such as how to bridge or accommodate the fact/value 
distinction. This has ‘clouded’ the more practical methodological concerns by having the 
debate at a level of abstraction that is removed from quality concerns over the actual 
presentation and analysis of data. The concern with metaethical issues is 
understandable and appropriate for a new discipline/area of inquiry/community of 
practice where the rationale and foundations of why we are doing something need to be 
articulated and defended. However, it is now appropriate to move on to think about 
how research in this area is designed, conducted and reported and how we distinguish 
‘good’ research in this area from that which is ‘bad’ or ‘less good’.11 
Hurst argues that, 
[i]deally, empirical research in bioethics should meet standards for 
empirical and normative validity similar to those used in the source 
disciplines for these methods, engaging when needed with colleagues 
within these disciplines, and articulate empirical and normative aspects 
explicitly and appropriately. (2010: 444) 
                                                          
11 See also Singh’s (2016) chapter in this volume. 
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This is one approach, but as empirical ethics integrates elements from these 
source disciplines (for example, but not exclusively, sociology and philosophy12), there 
needs to be some account of how the two are integrated in a robust way. The ‘Empirical 
Ethics Working Group’ from Germany (Mertz et al., 2014; Salloch et al., 2012) see this 
element as important, and Salloch et al. (2012) argue that good-quality empirical ethics 
research has to be based on an account of the conceptual relationship between the 
normative and the empirical. It could therefore be argued that good-quality research in 
empirical ethics has to incorporate rigour in both components of empirical ethics (i.e. 
bioethics and sociology) and then explain how the two aspects are integrated or inform 
each other.13 This seems a sensible requirement. 
Reporting Empirical Ethics 
Questions of quality are closely connected to issues of how to report results and publish 
empirical ethics research. Often, what may appear to be flaw in a study is a consequence 
of poor reporting and, similarly, good, polished reporting of a study can hide a multitude 
of sins. Reporting can be a particular challenge for interdisciplinary research, as 
conventions for disciplines differ. There are a few journals that explicitly welcome14 or 
are dedicated to empirical research in bioethics. The American Journal of Bioethics: 
                                                          
12 Empirical ethics draws on other disciplines, i.e. psychology, but in this chapter 
philosophy (specifically ethics) and sociology will be used as examples of the 
disciplinary tension between abstract and empirical theorising. 
13 For examples of an explanation of the method of combining the empirical and 
the normative, see Frith (2012), Ives (2014) and Molewijk et al. (2004), as well as the 
above chapters in Part II of this volume. 
14 For instance, the journal Clinical Ethics based in the UK has a section dedicated 
to empirical ethics. 
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Empirical Ethics journal, for example, recognises that there are different reporting 
conventions, and in its guideline for authors, says 
Many disciplines are welcome; flexibility with respect to 
methodological approach; structure of manuscript can fit the 
methodology; less strict about word/page limits; focus on integrity of 
methods (Miller, 2013). 
The main issue for reporting empirical ethics is that this type of research does 
not have its own established reporting norms and has to fit in with either the norms of 
bioethics and philosophical-style papers or the requirements for empirical papers (such 
as those that require papers to be structured with background, methods, results and 
discussion). Adopting either approach will involve compromises in the reporting of the 
data. 
As was argued above, if empirical ethics papers are expected to give an account 
of the empirical data, the ethical reasoning, and how the two are integrated, this can 
present difficulties both in the format required by some journals and in the restrictions 
on the length of journal articles. This presents a challenge for researchers to navigate 
and makes it hard to include all the key elements in one paper. The tight word limits 
imposed by some journals, for instance, may force authors to choose between 
elaborating on the method and discussing the distinctly ethical implications of the data 
reported in detail. Concentrating on the latter may obfuscate reviewers’ attempts to 
consider the quality of the study design, whilst neglecting this aspect in favour of the 
former may result in other reviewers being unconvinced that the normative conclusions 
have been properly justified. Word limits in journals, particularly medical journals, are a 
problem for all health care researchers using non-quantitative methods. The increasing 
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use of online supplementary material by journals has meant that space issues could, 
potentially, be overcome. But even here, deciding what is ‘supplementary’ can be an 
issue. 
So, how might these difficulties of reporting everything in one paper be 
addressed? We might set out two possible responses; but they are a far from ideal, and 
illustrate the difficulties of having to work within reporting structures designed for 
other disciplines. 
First, the results could be divided up, reporting empirical findings according to 
qualitative norms in a journal friendly to qualitative methods and the normative 
dimensions and reflections in bioethics journals, making reference to the findings 
published elsewhere. What is then lost is the element of integration that justified the 
choice of methodology for the original study design. And, perhaps worse, this approach 
appears to lend weight to the ‘jack of all trades, master of none’ characterisation of 
empirical ethics researchers (Dunn et al., 2008). 
Second, the scope of the findings reported could be curtailed, perhaps even 
reporting and discussing only a single finding in an attempt to do justice to both 
reporting norms and simultaneously demonstrate the value of integration. There are 
several dangers here too. One is that it appears to be making much of little, as the 
richness of the entire data set is somewhat hidden. Another is that it opens researchers 
either to the charge of unethical research practices, as data is collected that is not 
reported, or it creates an appearance of ‘salami publication’, as the process has to be 
repeated over several papers so that the full richness of the data can emerge. It is far 
from obvious which of these pragmatic responses is best, and neither represents how 
an empirical ethics project should ideally be reported. 
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These disciplinary-specific reporting norms are also reflected in the reviewer 
pools operated by journals. Bioethics journal reviewers might not want, or feel able, to 
judge the methods sections of an empirical ethics paper and may be critical of the 
normative analysis, arguing that insufficient attention has been paid to that aspect. 
Sociology journal reviewers may want more on the methods and be critical of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the paper, as they are unfamiliar with ethical theory and 
forms of argument. 
As interdisciplinary research becomes more established, and alongside this, 
empirical ethics, then we hope that journals will be amenable to more varied reporting 
norms that can encompass different forms of research, and provide better forums for 
this kind of research.15 
Assessing Quality 
In practice, how might the quality of empirical research be assessed? It is our view that 
these quality issues will increasingly be addressed as the area grows and a body of good 
practice builds up. To draw again on the debates over the quality of qualitative research, 
there has been growing consideration of how to assess the quality of qualitative 
research (see Murphy et al., 1998; Spencer et al., 2003). This has culminated in the 
formulation of some broad checklists for quality assessment (CASP). A similar type of 
                                                          
15 Arguably, more established researchers in this area could channel efforts into 
attempting to change the reporting cultural and norms of traditional journals – 
something that may be helped by exploiting the impact advantages of interdisciplinary 
findings – and by, themselves, being willing to support newer and specialist journals, 
not just by taking up seats on editorial boards and committees but also by using them as 
an outlet for their own papers and thereby contributing to the virtuous cycle that will 
increase the citation rates for these journals. 
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checklist could be produced for empirical ethics, and Mertz et al. (2014) have begun to 
develop this. They formulate what they call a ‘road map’ with four criteria: 
(1) Reflection on the relationship between empirical research and normative 
research questions. This addresses how the two elements are integrated and 
what theoretical frameworks underpin the study. 
(2) Relevance. This relates to the relevance of the study, both for advancing 
scientific and ethical understanding and relevance to society (‘impact’, in UK 
parlance). 
(3) Inter-disciplinary research practice. This has some overlap with the first 
criterion, and is focussed on how different disciplines interact (i.e. how 
decisions are made on a project with sociologists and philosophers), how 
data is gathered and analysed and the conclusions reached. 
(4) Research ethics and scientific ethos. This includes such matters as informed 
consent, competing interests, reporting and consequences for the future. 
There are certain generic criteria that any piece of research can be judged against 
(relevance of data to answering the research question, robustness of data analysis, how 
well has the research process been documented); although it would not solve debates 
over quality, this could provide a steer in the right direction. These criteria are a useful 
starting point for debate amongst the empirical ethics community and could be helpful 
for thinking about what to include in a journal article and how to report results. They 
provide a set of questions or areas to think about and, although they do not provide 
answers, that is not the job of quality guidelines. Therefore, checklists may only take us 
so far and there is still room for judgement, and hence disagreement, over what 
constitutes good-quality research in empirical ethics. This is not in itself a bad thing, as 
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all areas and disciplines debate scholarship, critique papers and aim to advance 
knowledge by improving on what has gone before. This is a sign, in fact, of healthy 
academic debate. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter we have argued that academic disciplines are not static, but ever-
changing, evolving forms of communities of practice. Bioethics is a relative newcomer 
on the scene that has grown out of philosophy to become a different kind of community 
of practice with different ends, goals, publishing forums and norms and, arguably, can 
be seen as an academic discipline in its own right. Empirical ethics is a further 
development and, under our formulation, draws on normative analysis and integrates it 
with empirical research to produce a distinctive analysis of ethical questions or 
situations. To be an expert in bioethics is to have a set of skills to draw on to help 
analyse ethical issues and determine and define the key areas of contention. Empirical 
ethics draws on this kind of expertise and uses this in empirical research that, under our 
analysis, has a distinctive set of concerns and priorities and makes it a different 
endeavour (as a community of practice) from, for example, medical sociology.16 
It is too early to say whether empirical ethics can be said to be a discipline in its 
own right or a methodological tool within bio- and applied ethics. As we have framed 
the concept of ‘discipline’, there is nothing that would prevent it from becoming a 
discipline if a sufficiently well-developed community of practice grew up and it became 
institutionally situated. The concerns over quality of this new type of enterprise are not 
surprising, and such concerns are raised about all new forms of inquiry. As empirical 
                                                          
16 See also McMillan’s (2016) chapter in this volume. 
  25 
ethics develops, quality and reporting issues will be increasingly debated and standards 
and processes developed and it is unrealistic to expect this to happen overnight. A 
major hurdle continues, however, to be the RAEs in the UK (or local equivalents) used 
to rank universities and their different departments. These forms of assessment tend to 
be conservatively played by academic institutions concerned about league tables. 
Greater consideration must be given to how to incorporate new forms of research 
endeavours, such as interdisciplinary research, in RAEs. These exercises are very 
important, and shape how universities focus their  priorities. Therefore, how the quality 
and utility of empirical ethics is assessed is a crucial issue for this emerging area of 
academic inquiry. 
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